Summary of Illinois v. Rodriguez, United States Supreme Court, 1979

Statement of the Case:

Rodriguez, the D and homeowner, moved to suppress drugs and paraphernalia seized at the time of his arrest, on the ground that the woman who gave the consent to enter had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier and, at that time, had no authority to consent to the officers’ entry.

Procedure:

Circuit court, granting the motion to suppress, ruled that (1) at the time she consented to the entry, the woman did not have common authority over the apartment, since she was an “infrequent visitor” at the apartment, rather than a “usual resident,” and (2) the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment was violated even if the officers reasonably believed at the time of their entry that the woman possessed the authority to consent. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, affirmed

Facts:

Fischer appeared to have been severely beaten by D. She took police officers to D’s apartment (which Fischer referred to as “our” apartment), unlocked the door with her key, and gave the officers permission to enter. They had neither an arrest nor a search warrant. Upon entry, the officers observed cocaine and drug paraphernalia in plain view. They arrested D, charging him with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

D moved to suppress all evidence, claiming that Fischer had no authority to consent to the entry. Trial court granted the motion, concluding that Fischer was an “infrequent visitor” and not a “usual resident.” This was based upon the findings that Fischer’s name was not on the lease, that she did not pay rent, she was not allowed to invite other to the apartment on her own, she did not have access to the apartment when D was away, and that she had moved some of her possessions from the apartment.

Issue:

Whether the 4th Amendment’s reasonable search requirement is satisfied when police conduct a warrantless search of a person’s home based upon the apparently authorized consent of another, and the person is later shown to not have authority to grant such a search.

Procedural Result:

Judgment reversed and remanded for the Government.

Holding:

The 4th Amendment’s reasonable search requirement is satisfied when police conduct a warrantless search of a person’s home based upon the apparently authorized consent of another and the person is later shown to not have authority to grant such a search, SO LONG AS it is reasonable for the officers to believe that the person had authority to grant the search, based on the totality of the circumstances.

Reasoning:

• Lower court was reversed in its holding that (1) at the time she consented to the entry, the woman did not have common authority over the apartment, since she was an “infrequent visitor” at the apartment, rather than a “usual resident,” and (2) the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment was violated even if the officers reasonably believed at the time of their entry that the woman possessed the authority to consent.
• Rule:  A warrantless search of a home is valid if police at that moment reasonably believe that the consenting party has authority over the premises.
  • The 4th Amendment’s reasonableness requirement simply requires that agents of the government act reasonably, not that they are always correct.
  • The Constitution is no more violated when officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when they enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape.
• However, this does not mean that law enforcement officers can always accept a person’s invitation to enter premises.
• Reasonableness Test:  The determination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective standard:
  • Whether the facts available to the officer at the moment lead a man of reasonable caution to believe that the consenting party had authority over the premises.
    • If not, then absent actual authority, the search is invalid.
    • If so, the search is valid.

Dissent:

• Other cases have already considered warrantless home intrusions in the absence of an exigency.
• Since no exigent circumstances existed here, the law enforcement officials relied on a third party’s consent instead of securing a warrant must accept the risk of error.