Summary of Michigan v. Moseley 423 U.S. 96 (1975) Page 87 LL

Statement of the case: The defendant moved to suppress his incriminating statement, asserting that under the Miranda decision, it was impermissible for the second officer to question him about the murder after he had refused to answer the first officer’s questions about the robberies,

Procedure below: The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant was subsequently convicted. The Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed, holding that the second police officer’s interrogation of the defendant was a per se violation of the Miranda doctrine. Further appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of Michigan. Certiorari was granted to the SC.

Statement of facts: The defendant, who had been arrested in connection with certain robberies, exercised his right to remain silent after a police officer, seeking to interrogate the defendant as to the robberies, had advised the defendant of his rights under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona. The police officer immediately ceased the interrogation when the defendant declined to discuss the robberies, and the defendant was then taken to a cell. More than two hours later, another police officer took the defendant to another place in the building and, after properly advising him of his Miranda rights, questioned him concerning an unrelated holdup murder, obtaining an incriminating statement from the defendant, who neither asked to consult with a lawyer nor indicated that he did not want to discuss the homicide.

Legal issues: Whether once a D exercises his right to remain silent, may he later be interrogated on another subject as long as reasonable time has passed and a new warning given.

Holding: Once a D exercises his right to remain silent, he may later be interrogated on another subject as long as reasonable time has passed and a new warning given.

Reasoning: The Court held that (1) the Miranda requirement that police interrogation must cease when the person in custody indicated that he wished to remain silent, neither created a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer at any time or place on any subject, nor imposed a blanket prohibition against the taking or the admission in evidence of voluntary statements, nor permitted a resumption of interrogation after a momentary cessation, (2) the admissibility of incriminating statements obtained after a person in custody had initially decided to remain silent depended on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored, and (3) the defendant’s incriminating statement in the case at bar was admissible in evidence, since (a) the defendant had been properly advised of his Miranda rights at both interrogations, (b) when the defendant exercised his right to remain silent at the first interrogation, the officer ! immediately ceased the questioning, and (c) the second interrogation occurred after a significant time lapse, was directed solely to the holdup murder, which was not related to the robberies, and was conducted at another location in the building by another officer. There was no evidence that the police used interrogations as a pattern of coercion to deprive D of his right against compulsory self-incrimination.

Concurring: (White, J.) The real issue is the voluntariness of the confession, and the holding should be expanded to recognize this test.