Summary of Missouri v. Seibert
Citation: 542 U.S. 600 (2004)

Relevant Facts: Patrice Seibert was accused of arson in relation to a fire that resulted in a fatality. Seibert’s son suffered from cerebral palsy, and following his death (while sleeping) she feared charges of neglect. Missouri police alleged her involvement in burning the family’s mobile home, thus concealing the cause of her son’s death, and the death of another mentally-ill young man living with the family. Police questioned Seibert without issuing her a Miranda warning, and she confessed both her involvement in arson and intention to kill the young man during the fire. Following a break, police issued proper Miranda warnings to Seibert, and she again confessed her involvement in arson and murder. The police officer that took both statements testified at trial that he intentionally withheld Miranda warnings prior to the first confession as a strategy to have Seibert repeat her confession after being properly advised of her rights, thereby obtaining admissible evidence. The Missouri trial court granted Seibert’s motion for suppression of the first confession, but denied her motion to suppress the second confession. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, but the State Supreme Court reversed, arguing that the second confession was the product of the first, illegal confession and that police intentionally withheld proper procedural warnings.

Issue: Do police officers violate a suspect’s constitutional criminal procedure rights through intentional failure to provide proper Miranda warnings before eliciting a confession, and then obtaining a second confession following a proper warning?

Holding: Yes, police officers that engage in the “question first, warn later” strategy to interrogate suspects violate their constitutional rights and the spirit of Miranda. The Court was unable to reach the requisite majority to adopt a clear rationale for their decision, but affirmed the state Supreme Court’s reversal of Seibert’s conviction.

Reasoning: The Court failed to produce a majority opinion. Justice Souter’s plurality opinion, however, garnered support from Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Explaining the nature of and rationale behind Miranda warnings, Justice Souter explained that confessions without prior warning are typically suppressed, while confessions following warning and waiver are almost always admissible. This general presumption is possible because Miranda warnings generate an informed choice by suspects, suggesting genuine determination regarding whether or not to speak to police, thus producing a presumption regarding admissibility. Justice Souter also pointed out that the Court had reaffirmed Miranda, refusing to return to the prior regime in which statements were evaluated individually for involuntariness, and maintaining a clear set of expectations regarding law enforcement behavior.

Concurrence: Justice Souter, after discussing the nature of required warnings to suspects, continued to apply those basic guarantees and the underlying logic to the facts in this case. He argued that in reviewing a particular mode of conduct for appropriateness in light of constitutional guarantees, the threshold issue is whether the procedure in question allows Miranda to function effectively. Justice Souter concluded that in this case the purpose of the divided interrogation is to produce a confession before the defendant had been made aware of her rights, and then hope to have her repeat her statement after being issued proper warnings. The plurality concluded it would be inappropriate to treat two interrogations closely related in time and circumstance as separate instances for evaluation merely because they were divided by formal Miranda warnings. Given the closely related time of the two interrogations, Justice Souter concluded that a reasonable person would not feel free to avoid continued interrogation even after provided with a warning during questioning. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment of the Court. Writing separately, he argued that the plurality would go too far in excluding virtually all confessions obtained in a two-step interrogation process. Justice Kennedy preferred to preserve the essence of Miranda by evaluating the intention of the officers involved, judged by whether the attempt to use the prior, inadmissible confession to illicit an admissible statement. Under Justice Kennedy’s view, officers should be required to take curative steps and ensure that the suspect understood that they were free to refuse making further statements, and that their prior statements were likely inadmissible, possibly also requiring a break in time between periods of interrogation. Justice Breyer concurred, arguing for a different standard based on the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. In his view, divided interrogations punctuated by Miranda warnings tainted statements made after warnings and should result in their exclusion, allowing exceptions for good faith failure to warn.

Dissent: Justice O’Connor dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas. First, Justice O’Connor noted agreement with the plurality in so far as they rejected standards based on subjective intentions of police officers and developing a “fruits” analysis for evaluating the relatedness of the two statements. In the view of the dissenters, the key issue is voluntariness, traditionally evaluated from the standpoint of the suspect. In applying that standard, Justice O’Connor suggested the Court should adopt a test emphasizing traditional factors for evaluating whether a statement is voluntary, followed by evaluating how the first statement relates to the second, including how closely related they are in time, location, and identity of the interrogator.

Conclusion: The Court, failing to reach a majority, concluded only that the procedure at issue here violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. In applying this case, courts have split regarding the appropriate standard to apply, with some relying on Justice Kennedy’s subjective intent analysis, and others testing the effect of police behavior standard from Justice Souter’s opinion.