Summary of Kansas v. Hendricks
Citation: 521 U.S. 346 (1997)

Relevant Facts: Leroy Hendricks had a long history of sexually molesting children. In 1994, he neared release from prison after serving ten years of his sentence following conviction for taking “indecent liberties” with two thirteen-year-old boys. However, the State of Kansas had recently passed the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) to allow prosecutors to pursue civil commitment of individuals likely to engage in “predatory acts of sexual violence.” Hendricks was the first person Kansas authorities sought to have committed under the new law. Under its terms, the State could petition to have individuals committed upon demonstrating they suffered from a “mental abnormality” likely to cause them to engage in predatory sexual behaviors. At trial on the issue of commitment, Hendricks agreed with State doctors’ diagnoses of uncured pedophilia. The jury determined that Hendricks was a violent sexual predator, the judge concluded that pedophilia qualified as a mental abnormality under state law, and Hendricks was ordered committed. Hendricks appealed and argued that his commitment violated his due process rights, protection against double jeopardy, and the prohibition upon ex post facto laws. The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed as to his due process claim, concluding that civil commitment required a showing of “mental illness” (as opposed to mental abnormality) and imminent threat of danger. Kansas appealed.

Issue: Does civil commitment of a sexual offender following completion of his criminal sentence violated his due process rights? Does the Kansas Act violate Respondent’s rights protecting him from double jeopardy? Does the Kansas Act constitute and impermissible ex post facto law?

Holding: No, states may confine those that are both dangerous and unable to control their behavior and are not required to use specific terminology to do so, but must have fair procedures and acceptable evidentiary standards. The Kansas Act violates neither double jeopardy nor the prohibition on ex post facto laws.

Reasoning: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. First, Justice Thomas explained that the Court has consistently allowed an individual’s liberty interest in remaining free from restraint to be overridden- even in the civil context- under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the Court has historically found civil commitment constitutionally acceptable, so long as states adopted commitment procedures with sufficient safeguards, proper procedures, and adequate evidentiary standards. The Kansas Act at issue requires a pre-commitment determination of mental abnormality and likelihood of engaging in predatory sexual behavior. The Court, Justice Thomas explained, has always allowed civil commitment upon showing of threatened danger and something more- such as mental illness. Contrary to Hendricks claim and the conclusion of the Kansas Supreme Court, the state was not required to adopt the term “mental illness” in the statute. Rather, states may use whatever terminology they wish so long as it relates to medical findings related to both danger and conduct beyond the control of the individual subject to commitment. Accordingly, the Act in question is consistent with due process. As to double jeopardy, the Court explained that the commitment proceedings were civil and not criminal as they did not impose punishment. Commitment serves neither to deter nor provide retribution, the two classic functions of a punitive law. Furthermore, the Act is not rendered punitive by virtue of either the lack of an available treatment or treatment serving as an ancillary purpose. As confinement here is neither punitive nor the product of criminal proceedings, double jeopardy does not apply. Finally, the Act is not an ex post facto law as that prohibition only applies to criminal laws. Furthermore, even if the Act were punitive it still would not constitute an ex post facto law as it did not criminalize any new behavior or deprive Hendricks of any available defense.

Concurrence: Justice Kennedy concurred, writing separately to make some limiting observations. While he agreed that the Kansas Act was not an ex post facto law, he pointed out that in some cases states may attempt to use civil commitment to avoid the consequences of failure in criminal trials or to correct the deficiencies of an improvident plea bargain. Justice Kennedy concluded that if a statute, such as the one here, were to become a vehicle for general deterrence or retribution; it would surpass the limits of Court precedent and raise constitutional concerns.

Dissent: Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, and joined by Justice Ginsburg as to Parts II and III. First, Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that Hendricks failed in his substantive due process claim. However, the dissenters argued that because treatment under the Kansas scheme was at best secondary in purpose and the record reflected inadequate provision of treatment, it was appropriate to view the commitments under the Act as punitive. As a punitive measure passed after Hendricks crimes were committed, it would constitute an impermissible ex post facto law.

Conclusion: Civil commitment laws comport with due process so long as states require proof of imminent danger and something else- typically inability to control behavior based on a mental illness. The law in question was no punitive, but merely civil, and thus neither double jeopardy nor the prohibition on ex post fact laws have any bearing on this case.