Summary of Eisenstadt v. Baird
Citation: 405 U.S. 438 (1972)

Relevant Facts: William Baird was arrested and charged with a felony for distributing contraceptive foam to an unmarried woman following a lecture he delivered to students on contraception. Under Massachusetts law, it was a felony for anyone other than a doctor or pharmacist to distribute contraceptives, and even licensed professionals were restricted from distributing contraceptives to anyone but married couples. Baird was convicted in state court, and his appeals were unsuccessful. He then filed for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, seeking to challenge his conviction on constitutional grounds and directed his suit against Eisenstadt, the sheriff that prosecuted his case. The district court dismissed his petition, but the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the statute was a per se prohibition on contraception at odds with both fundamental human rights and Supreme Court precedent.

Issues: Does Respondent have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the law given that he is neither unmarried nor authorized to distribute contraceptives under the statute? Does the differing treatment of unmarried and married persons with regard to contraception under Massachusetts law violate Equal Protection or Due Process?

Holding: Yes, respondent has standing to challenge the law. Yes, the asserted justifications for restricting contraceptives were insufficient and there was not valid reason for differentiating between married and unmarried persons based on the record thus violating equal protection guarantees. The Court did not reach the Due Process issue.

Reasoning: Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall. First, the Court considered the threshold standing issue. The majority considered that the statute in question was not a health statute, thus enabling Baird to attack it directly as there would then be no basis for prohibiting his conduct under the terms of the law. However, the Court based its standing decision on the ability of Baird to assert third party interests, in this case the right of unmarried persons to seek contraceptives, comparing the case to Griswold (where the Court concluded privacy guarantees extended to married couples seeking contraception) and concluding that third-party protection rationales were stronger where distributors but not users were subject to prosecution given the result on availability of contraceptives. Turning to the merits, Justice Brennan pointed out that Equal Protection assumes equality of treatment but does not forestall the possibility of differentiation, so long as differing treatment results from reasonable, non-arbitrary distinctions bearing a substantial relation to the legislation at issue. In this case, the Court considered that the statute was contained in the chapter pertaining to morals, evincing legislative intent to regulate conduct it found objectionable rather than the public health. Furthermore, if public health were the true aim, the statute is both discriminatory and over-broad, regulating differently classes of persons but subject to health concerns and prohibiting behavior that may rationally be viewed as in the interests of public health. Turning to the important privacy considerations in the background of this case, the Court pointed out that the interests of unmarried individuals are just as apparent as married couples in protecting important, private conduct from state intrusion. While not decided on privacy grounds, the Court was aided by Griswold and other cases in evaluating the nature of differentiation by the State in the legislation at issue. The State failed to provide an adequate justification for treating married and unmarried persons differently, or a legitimate concern for public health, and therefore the statute violated the equal protection rights of the very persons Baird asserted the right to aide.

Concurrence/Dissent: Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion. While he joined the majority, he would have decided the case on narrower, First Amendment grounds. Justice Douglas reasoned that Baird gave a lengthy presentation on contraception and related subjects, and afterward provided a single sample of contraceptives to a member of the audience. Justice Douglas opined that his actions could have reasonably been construed as an aide to his speech, and though involving conduct, protected as a necessary component of Baird’s right to free expression. Justice White concurred in the result, joined by Justice Blackmun. Justice White argued that because Baird could not have been convicted of distribution the foam product at issue to a married person, the State did not have a legitimate interest in regulating his conduct, and thus his conviction could not stand. Justice White would have preferred to decide the case on this more narrow rationale and avoid delving into uncharted constitutional territory regarding the rights of unmarried couples to access contraceptives. Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the record was unclear on the health effects of the product in question. He believed that the State had a legitimate interest in restricting the channels of distribution of medical products and advice to qualified professionals, and saw no basis for preventing rational restrictions in service of that goal.

Conclusion: Equal protection prevents states from treating unmarried couples differently than married couples with regard to distribution of birth control, absent a reasonable reason for doing so that was lacking in this case. The Court rested its holding on equal protection grounds, rather than due process or privacy concerns.