Summary of Illinois v. Wardlow
Citation: 528 U.S. 119 (2000)

Relevant Facts: Chicago police officers, in the course of routine patrols of an area well-known for narcotics, spotted William “Sam” Wardlow. Mr. Wardlow, upon seeing a group of police vehicles converge on his position, fled the area carrying a bag. Two officers, after catching up with Wardlow, conducted a pat down search based on their experience and belief that individuals in areas known for narcotics trafficking were likely to be carrying weapons. During the limited search, officers discovered Wardlow was carrying a handgun and arrested him. At trial, Wardlow challenged the admissibility of the gun based on the nature of the search, arguing that officers lacked individualized suspicion to search him and that flight, alone, is insufficient to justify a stop and frisk search. The Trial Court disagreed, and Wardlow was convicted. The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed, claiming that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to make a stop, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that flight alone does not arouse reasonable suspicion and may instead be viewed as exercising the right to “go on one’s way.”

Issue: Did the limited stop and frisk search in this case, based on flight from a known high-crime area, violate the Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights?

Holding: No, the search here was consistent with the demands of the Fourth Amendment. Limited searches based on street encounters need only be based on reasonable suspicion, and not probable cause, in order to pass Constitutional muster.

Reasoning: Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, explained that this case fit within the traditional Terry standard governing brief encounters between police and citizens in public areas. Accordingly, officers only need a reasonable, articulate suspicions specific to the suspect in order to conduct a valid, limited search. The majority explained that presence in a high-crime area, alone, is insufficient, as is flight standing alone, but that location and behavior are both relevant in assessing whether officers had reasonable suspicions that criminal activity was afoot. While the reasonable suspicion standard is less stringent that the traditional probable cause standard for conducting a search, the nature of searches like this is reasonably limited by the circumstances and still contains a minimal, objective standard evaluated for sufficiency. The officers here could reasonably have been suspicious of the location of Wardlow’s unprovoked flight, and stopped him for questioning based on that suspicion. The basic nature of stops such as this is investigatory, allowing officers the opportunity to follow their suspicions while admitting that they do not yet have probable cause of criminal behavior. In such cases, officers may reasonable investigate further, and conduct brief searches, ending the encounter once ambiguities have been resolved or if they fail to establish probable cause. When, as here, the brief encounter uncovers further evidence, the evidence produced is admissible consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

Concurrence/Dissent: Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissenters agreed with the majority that a bright line rule regarding flight from police and the validity of subsequent searches was unwarranted, preferring instead to evaluate the totality of the circumstances in a particular case. However, in agreeing with the test announced by the majority (evaluating the totality of the circumstances) the dissenters found the factual record in this case wanting. Pointing out the variety of reasons that could lead to flight from police or flight merely coincidentally occurring with police in proximity, the dissenters concluded that on the record before the Court there was insufficient evidence of particularized suspicion and that the search relied too heavily on flight from police. Agreeing with the standard but disagreeing with application to the limited factual basis articulated here, the dissenters would have affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court and overturned Wardlow’s conviction based on the search they concluded was unreasonable.

Conclusion: Officers must articulate a reasonable suspicion particular to a suspect in order to justify a stop and frisk search. Flight from police may be considered evidence of criminal conduct, but is alone insufficient to justify reasonable suspicion allowing for a subsequent search.