Summary of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.
Citation: 545 U.S. 546 (2005)

Relevant Facts: Allapattah Services, Inc. was one of approximately 10,000 Exxon dealers that joined in a class-action suit against Exxon Mobil Corp. alleging an intentional scheme to systematically overcharge dealers for their fuel. The plaintiffs brought their case in Federal District Court, invoking that Court’s diversity jurisdiction. After a jury verdict in favor of Allapattah and the other plaintiffs, the district court certified an interlocutory appeal as to whether the exercise of jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. 1332 and 28 U.S.C. 1367. While the plaintiffs satisfied the diversity requirement of § 1332, not all plaintiffs independently satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirements under that section. The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate where at least one of the named plaintiffs satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement, with the remaining class members claims within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court based on supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, combining the case with another case from a different Circuit, in order to resolve a circuit split regarding the proper interpretation of § 1367.

Issue: Does 28 U.S.C. 1367 grant federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over cases where individual plaintiffs do not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirements for invoking diversity jurisdiction, but at least one of the named plaintiffs does satisfy all jurisdictional requirements?

Holding: Yes, where the other necessary elements for invoking jurisdiction are present and at least one plaintiff satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirements for diversity jurisdiction, exercise of jurisdiction over the claims of the remaining plaintiffs is appropriate under supplemental jurisdiction so long as those claims are part of the same Article III claim or controversy.

Reasoning: Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. He explained the nature of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Constitution, with Article III authorizing but not requiring Congress to confer jurisdiction on federal courts, and Congress having granted jurisdiction less than what is constitutionally permissible. Accordingly, this cases concerns statutory interpretation regarding exactly what jurisdiction Congress conferred. Prior to § 1367, district courts did not have jurisdiction over claims where individual parties failed to satisfy any element required by § 1332. The grant of supplemental jurisdiction expanded the subject matter jurisdiction of federal district courts while maintaining complete diversity requirements and that supplemental claims be part of the same case or controversy. The text of the supplemental jurisdiction statute clearly expanding jurisdiction, but the question before the Court was simple: does supplemental jurisdiction extend to cases in which some but not all parties meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, assuming other jurisdictional requirements are met and the joined claims are part of the same case or controversy? As to that limited question, the Court provided a simple “yes” answer. Under § 1367, when a district court has jurisdiction over a claim, that Court also has jurisdiction over all other claims that are part of the same civil action. The Court rejected the theory that diversity requirements and amount-in-controversy requirements should be treated similarly; to wit, that the presence of a non-diverse party defeats jurisdiction while the presence of a party failing to independently satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement does not. Here, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the text and history of the statute were clear, and it made little sense to treat amount-in-controversy requirements (designed to ensure that federal courts heard cases that are sufficient substantial) the same as other jurisdictional requirements. Finally, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Court need not consider the legislative history or subsequent Congressional action, as the text of the statute itself provided a sufficiently clear answer.

Dissent: Justice Stevens dissented and filed an opinion, joined by Justice Breyer. Justice Stevens argued that the statutory language was ambiguous, and that legislative history would have aided the Court in reaching a better-informed judgment regarding Congressional intent. He also pointed out that Justice Ginsburg had persuasively argued exactly that point. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined in her opinion by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Breyer. In her lengthy opinion, Justice Ginsburg argued that the expansion of supplemental jurisdiction was prompted by a single case, designed to clarify district court jurisdiction over federal questions. Carefully examining the legislative history of the relevant portion of the statute, the dissenters concluded that a more narrow reading was preferable to the analysis of the majority. After a detailed analysis of ancillary and pendant jurisdiction, the historical precursors to supplemental jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the ambiguities of the statute as enacted should be read to preserve continuity and precedent, in so far as that construction is possible. In applying that standard, she concluded that Congress did not intended, nor did the language they adopted enact, an expansive grant of additional jurisdiction such that joined parties should no longer have to independently meet ALL requirements of diversity jurisdiction, including the individual consideration of the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Conclusion: The majority concluded that the statutory language was sufficient clear to justify their interpretation, enabling federal courts to hear claims of all parties in a single diversity case so long as at least one party satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement.